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Abstract
Reductionism is the dominant stance of biology. According to this perspective, biological phenomena have to fit with
physical explanations. Some biologists thought that the introduction of the idea of program was a sound way to overcome
both physicalism and reductionism. We argue instead that the introduction of information theory into biology did not
liberate biology from reductionism. We argue that the adoption of information in biology is an erroneous transposition
from a specific mathematical domain to one where it does not belong. Indeed, the mathematical framework of the
information theory is too rigid and discrete to fit with biological phenomena. Therefore, information in biology represents
an inappropriate metaphor. Then, we make explicit the use of metaphors and the choice of explanation mode. We argue
that the choice of explanation is not neutral. Furthermore, the use of metaphors in science becomes dangerous when
they take the place of theories and they lose their paradoxical content.
Keywords: information, metaphor, reduction, entropy, complexity, mathematical invariance
To think that the genome completely determines
the organism is almost as absurd as thinking that
the pipes in a large cathedral organ determine
what the organist plays.
D. A. Noble “Theory of biological relativity”,
Interface Focus. 2012
1. Introduction
For at least two centuries two distinct and even an-
tagonistic stances co-existed in biology. In current termi-
nology, we refer to them as reductionism and organicism.
The former is going to be addressed in this article while
the latter is addressed in Mossio et al (this issue). The his-
tory of physics shows that a new phenomenon has always
engendered new observables and principles. For instance,
Galileo proposed momentum and its principle of conser-
vation (inertia); thermodynamics studies trajectories in a
relevant phase space: pressure, volume, temperature. A
new observable, entropy, has greatly enriched physics by
providing a principle that can be applied to any form of
energy transformation: the second principle of thermo-
dynamics1. Does biology operate similarly regarding the
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choice its observables and invariants? At the beginning of
the 20th century, the central goal was to find observables
and principles to understand the phenomenon of repro-
duction resulting in the hereditary transmission of pheno-
types. In this context, the search for a proper observable
specific to biology headed toward the notions of encod-
ing and of program that are at the core of the theories of
information.
In this paper, we argue that information is problem-
atic for biology for at least three of the reasons that we
will analyze here. First of all, we claim that the transpo-
sition of the mathematical theory of information into the
biological field is scientifically erroneous. To this aim, in
the first section, we analyze the incompatibility between
the information sciences and the biological object.
The second reason is related to a general problem of re-
ductionism. According to the distinguished biologist Ernst
Mayr, the information field provides an anti-reductionist
framework for biology. Despite this viewpoint, we argue
that applying the theory of information to biology belongs
to a reductionist attitude. In the second section, we ana-
lyze this reductionist approach, and we point out the rela-
tionship with determinism. We show that the reductionist
stance hides the general idea according to which classical
determinism is the regular form of scientific knowledge and
that this is also true when information theory is applied
to biology. For the reasons analyzed in the first section, it
will be clear that the deterministic theoretical framework
is inappropriate for biological theorizing.
Faced with this kind of criticism, oftentimes biologists
defend the use of the idea of information, as well as the
concepts of signal and program, as just useful metaphors
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or fruitful ways with which to approach a phenomenon by
using an image borrowed from common sense. That is why,
in the last and conclusive section, we analyze the general
use of metaphors and common sense in science, and we
show their dangerous consequences. This is particularly
the case of the idea of information and the genetic program
in biology because, as we will explain, here we face a dead
metaphor.
2. Information Sciences and Biology
The use of the concept of information in biology ap-
peared in the middle of the 20th century, but it is related
to what happened at the beginning of that century when
the possibility of isolating chromosomes was coupled with
the new concept of the mendelian gene as a functional unit
of recombination. Mendel’s writings did not directly im-
ply this concept, which appeared after 1900 when Hugo de
Vries, Erich von Taschermark, and Carl Correns "rediscov-
ered" Mendel (see Pichot, 1999). Johannsen (1911), then,
replaced the term mendelian factor with the term gene
and suggested the consequent distinction between geno-
type and phenotype (see Moss, 2004). Therefore, the idea
of associating a phenotype with a segment of these chro-
mosomes appeared. Schrödinger (1944) then, realized that
this association was not well founded in a law: “It seems
neither adequate nor possible to dissect into discrete ’prop-
erties’ the pattern of an organism which is essentially a
unity, a ‘whole’. Now, [. . . ] a pair of ancestors are differ-
ent in a certain well-defined respect [. . . ] we locate in the
chromosome the seat of this difference. Difference of prop-
erties, to my view, is really the fundamental concept rather
than the property itself” (Schrödinger, 1944, p. 10). This
great physicist understood that differential analysis does
not allow for the deduction of a law in the physical sense.
In order to obtain a law in the proper sense, it would be
necessary to propose a direct causal link, between the wild
gene and the normal phenotype. He introduced the notion
of encoding, borrowed from the new sciences of coding, in
order to provide a theoretical framework and establish this
hypothetical correlation. In other words, the fact that a
mutation modifies the structure of an enzyme does not al-
low for the deduction of a direct one gene - one enzyme
correlation2 (following Beadle & Tatum, 1941). The no-
tion of information was introduced as a theoretical frame-
work providing this direct causal link. However, it is scien-
tifically inexcusable to adopt this notion in biology without
clarifying its usage with respect to at least two of the fields
which make rigorous use of it. These fields are information
elaboration (Turing-Kolmogorov), (Turing, 1936) or algo-
rithmic theory of information (see Calude, 1994; Davis,
1958), and information transmission (Shannon-Brillouin),
(Brillouin, 1962, Shannon 1948).
2 Which we now know to be an erroneous bijective correspon-
dence.
The Central Dogma of molecular biology (Crick &Wat-
son, 1953; Crick, 1970) suggested that the description of
the chemical structure of the DNA molecule represents
well the core of the informational/algorithmic view of bi-
ological phenomena. The idea here is that the expression
from nucleic acid to protein is a unidirectional flow of in-
formation. Which information theory is involved here?
Despite the different scientific implications of these the-
ories, there is a significant confusion in biology which is
rarely clarified. Maynard Smith (2000) explicitly refers to
information elaboration (Turing-Kolmogorov) and to in-
formation transmission (Shannon-Brillouin) while empha-
sizing the relevance of the latter in biology. However, in
the same text, he explains how molecular encoding can
work as a short “recipe” (his wording) for generating com-
plex, but organized (ordered) objects. The analogy is then
the recipe for describing a circle by the three parameters
which determine it. This recipe is less complex and con-
tains less information than a point by point description of
the circle. On the contrary, a totally disordered set can
only be described point by point, as it does not obey as
a rule. Now, this notion of a short (compressed) program
for an organized object and of (maximal) informational
complexity of disorder is that of Kolmogorov, and it is co-
variant (“it grows together”) with entropy (total disorder
has maximal entropy). Note instead that, according to
Shannon and Brillouin, complexity, as covariant with the
quantity of information, is contra-variant with entropy and
is in fact negentropy (it has the opposite sign and, thus,
information decreases when entropy increases). This is
also how physicists describe it, for sound reasons internal
to the theory of “transmission of information” which thus
differs greatly from Kolmogorov’s one, a theory of “elab-
oration of information” (Longo, Miquel, Sonnenschein, &
Soto, 2012).
Another important difficulty lies in the fact that infor-
mation in the two senses explored above deals with the
realm of the discrete. Now, in this discrete framework,
that is a precise concept in mathematics, only the dynam-
ics of the discrete parts are relevant for the explanation
of the entire system. In biology these discrete parts are
molecules, so molecules alone forcibly and fully retain the
researchers’ attention. In this context it would be very
hard to integrate, as a positive contribution to the expres-
sion of information, others events such as torsion, pres-
sure (see for example (Lesne & Victor, 2006; Farge 2003),
the dynamics of contact, geometries and relative distances,
which all causally contribute to gene expression. A com-
puter (Turing) or a cable (Shannon) does not receive a pos-
itive contribution from these observables which are better
understood using continuous mathematics. In fact, in both
the mathematicalabove theories of information, grounded
on the treatment of discrete sequences of signs, such mate-
rial dynamics can only cause an increase in noise3. On the
3 It would be possible and interesting to provide a theory of bio-
information by integrating the theory of continua. Control theory,
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contrary, in biology we need a theory that includes such
dynamics in a causal sense because they have a specific
role in the gene expression and in the morphological con-
stitution of the organism. In short, biological processes,
which take place in an organism simultaneously, are cou-
pled to continuous dynamics that unfold in physical space
and time.
Furthermore, in both theories of information, the flow
of information does not depend on the material that car-
ries the information. Crick refers to the Morse code when
addressing genetic information. Now, the nice idea behind
this practice of Morse-type encoding is that it depends nei-
ther on its form nor on the material which conveys it. It
is possible to transmit Morse code through smoke clouds,
light flashes, electric impulses, and so on. It is then possi-
ble to encode the signals using different pitches, different
materials, colors, etc. This independence of the encoding
from its material embodiment is actually at the core of the
two great theories of information of the 20th century that
we mentioned. In other words, information is an invari-
ant with respect to the transformations pertaining to the
physical medium or to the form of encoding. In fact, these
transformations of material, leaving the informational con-
tent invariant, can be performed on the most complex of
our informational machines, the computer. Specifically, if
your machine is dying, due to the age of the material, you
can transfer, via cable or wifi, the operating system, the
compilers, all programs, onto another machine4. This rad-
ical software vs. hardware dualism of the Turing Machine
is at the core of all contemporary computer science. With
their differences, as discussed above, these two theories
share the same radical properties of well-theorized invari-
ance, giving rise to central theorems for both theories.
What about biology? At which level would it be possi-
ble to find the fundamental invariant of information? Do
we have another way to encode such "genetic information"
than through the DNA and RNA? Are there other forms of
transmission and elaboration of this "information", other-
wise than the specific molecular cascades active within the
cell? Is it possible to encode the informational "content" of
these molecules, carried in DNA, by using different materi-
als, such as wood, metal, or a different chemistry, or beeps,
flashes, octets, pairs of colors? Would this transposition
alone be able to generate living organisms? Evidently not:
there only exists the physico-chemical materiality of DNA
and RNA with their very specific roles in biological phe-
nomena. Biological dynamics radically depend on their
materiality, and this is far from the independence of mat-
for instance, deals with information by differential equations in a
continuum, not to mention the new productive area of Information
Geometry (Barbaresco, Djafari, 2015), entirely ignored in (molecu-
lar) biology.
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In Manchester, during the 100th anniversary of Turing’s birth
(2012), students built a Turing machine made of Lego blocks . . .
and it works, it is Turing complete (albeit somewhat slow).
ter proper to digital information theories. Moreover, DNA
or RNA are not "rigid" and this is essential to biological
processes: for instance, redundancy or, better yet, Edel-
man’s degeneracy is omnipresent (Edelman, Gally, 2001).
In short, it is not even possible here to speak of physical
invariance/stability: the physical chemistries of DNA and
RNA do not allow themselves to be set once and for ever.
By definition they change while being conserved.
Rather, as proposed in Mossio et al. (this issue), the
proper biological observable is “material organization”. From
the structure of DNA to neuronal dynamics, biological
activities exist solely in their highly organized physical,
chemical and biological materiality. Quite the opposite of
information, the polyvalent use of a given material is a
core property in biology. Would it be possible to relate in-
formation to ‘processes’ instead of ‘materials’ (molecules)?
Would this save the notion of information for biology? We
reject this option. Biological processes, as shown in chap-
ter 4, are subordinated to their material realization and to
the organization of the living. They can not be considered
independent from them nor as “informational invariants”,
in the scientific sense of this term.
In conclusion, there is no reason for the physico-chemical
trace of a history, such as DNA, to be considered as “infor-
mation”. A rock shaped by its history of rolling along the
current of a stream does not transfer information by hit-
ting, deforming, or breaking other rocks. Information is in
the mind of the geologist who studies its origin, not in the
rock itself nor in its dynamics, which, if we choose to use
such a word, may transmit a form or chemical structures.
3. Reductionism, determinism and mechanistic ex-
planations in biology
Ernst Mayr (1961) thought that applying to biology
the notion of a genetic program, borrowed from informa-
tion theories, was a good way to provide an autonomous
description of biology with respect to physics. The genetic
program was, in his mind, an anti-reductionist approach.
Here we show that, on the contrary, applying information
theory to biology belongs to a form of reductionism and
the theoretical consequences enhance our position accord-
ing to which information is not an appropriate notion for
biology.
Reductionism is a philosophical attitude commonly dis-
tinguished into three main types: ontological, method-
ological and epistemic reductionism (See Brigandt & Love,
2014). Ontological reductionism, called physicalism, is a
general statement according to which there are no such
things separated from physical (chemical) things, so that
nothing but molecules constitutes an organism. Ontologi-
cal reduction does not necessarily mean that the explana-
tion of the physical level provides a complete explanation
of the entire organism. It is more a form of antisupernatu-
ralism that refuses any supernatural causes in biology such
as intelligent design or vital forces. Methodological reduc-
tionism claims that the best way to explain a complex sys-
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tem, such as an organism, is to access its lowest possible
level; that is the molecular and biochemical one. Finally,
epistemic reductionism is the idea that the knowledge of
one scientific domain can be reduced to what is supposed
to be a more fundamental body of scientific knowledge.
This attitude claims the possibility of translating a group
of scientific theories into another that is intended to be
the primary. These three philosophical postures share the
idea that physics is the fundamental level of a scientific
representation of nature. In all the three cases the reduc-
tion goes from biology to physics. In other words, physics
is nature and biology has to be, to different extents, sub-
ordinated to physics.
Classical geneticists, as well as early molecular biolo-
gists, were strongly committed to the idea that the living
can be entirely explained by its physical and chemical dy-
namics. Here the three philosophical attitudes of reduc-
tionism, ontological, methodological and epistemological,
converge. In fact, the physical and chemical dynamics are
supposed to be the ontological composition of the living
as well as the proper epistemic level of description and
also the only way to understand the complexity of the liv-
ing. This can be partially understood through a historical
event. During the 19th century, there was a debate be-
tween biologists of two different schools of thought: the
vitalists and the mechanists. Mechanicism focused on the
research of objectivity for biology in order to provide a sci-
entific foundation for this discipline otherwise vulnerable
to metaphysical implications5. This need pushed numer-
ous biologists to look at physics as a proper scientific model
of description and analysis. In this context, a very pecu-
liar form of reductionism surfaced in biological research.
This reductionism groups the idea that the elementary
components can explain the complex with the idea that
biology has to be reduced into the language and the laws
of chemistry and physics (See Rosenberg, 1985). Fran-
cis Crick, for instance, thought that explaining the living
by its elementary dynamics corresponds to the conviction
that biology is subordinated to physics (See Feltz, 1995).
In this context, the Central Dogma is not only reduction-
ist but strongly deterministic. The unidirectional flow of
information from genes to protein, coupled with the strong
specificity of the “one gene one enzyme” statement (Bea-
dle & Tatum, 1941), belong to a view of the organism
as a highly predetermined and predictable system. Of
course, from time to time, some "noise", as said explic-
itly in (Monod, 1970), may add some randomness to the
determination of the dynamics. Indeed, the level of reduc-
tion is not physics in general, but classical mechanics, a
deterministic field. The theoretical framework that served
as a model to biologists at this time was the strongly de-
terministic one of classical mechanics (the cell is a “Carte-
sian mechanism” for (Monod, 1970)). Here reductionism
and determinism overlap and converge in a strong commit-
5 Vitalism was considered too close to finalism. See (Canguilhem
1968).
ment: nature intrinsically corresponds to a necessary or-
der; this order can be expressed by mechanistic causes that
represent the universal law of the phenomenon. Through
these laws, phenomena must be predicted. The relation-
ship between reductionism, mechanistic explanation and
determinism in biology is the consequence of transferring
the theoretical framework of classical mechanics to biology.
These three aspects are strongly related and it is hard to
distinguish one from the other in the context of classical
molecular biology. Ernst Mayr’s thought is emblematic of
this conceptual relationship, enriched by his attempt to
stress the singularity of biology. According to Mayr, as
mentioned above, the notion of a genetic program is the
best way to establish the epistemological autonomy of bi-
ology with respect to physics (Mayr, 1961). The genetic
program is inspired by the theory of elaboration informa-
tion, which is a mathematical, not a physical theory. From
Mayr’s perspective, this would represent a methodologi-
cal anti-reductionism because the physical level would not
be directly involved in the description of the living. This
paradigm, though, uses the same deterministic structure
as that of classical mechanics: when the “causal relations”
are analyzed in informational cascades, they follow ex-
actly the early deterministic paradigms, in both Turing’s
and Shannon’s approaches. That is, the transfer of this
paradigm preserves many of the reductionist and phys-
icalist consequences related to this classical reference to
physics, starting from the Laplacian characteristic of the
system itself. That means that the organism is a determin-
istic system in which it is in principle possible to predict
the future dynamics (it is “Laplacian”), both in ontogen-
esis and in phylogenesis, by knowing the present state of
the “determining” elements of the system: DNA sequences
and genes. The rest provides at most “conditions of pos-
sibilities” and noise, as rigourously spelled out in (Mondo,
1970). This is more generally true in the neo-darwinian
approach, as strongly represented by Mayr. In fact, ac-
cording to neo-darwinism, natural selection applies exclu-
sively to the DNA level that has to preserve a deterministic
structure. Even if natural selection can not be reduced to
a Laplacian mechanistic process that includes all the an-
cestors of the organism and their environments, the level
where natural selection applies is deterministic. Otherwise
said, the fact that randomness is considered does not allow
to depart from Laplacian determinism. After all, Laplace
wass aware that randomness exist, that is why he studied
probability. But in his theoretical framework, randomness
appears as an external perturbation of deterministic dy-
namics (necessity) and it opposes to determination: it is
“noise” (Monod, 1970). In the neo-darwinian frame, deter-
minism is necessary for natural selection to apply. That is,
Evolution preserves the deterministic molecular processes
and is “the result of noise” plus selection (Monod, 1970).
The deterministic (Laplacian) nature of the coding and
decoding processes was perfectly clear to Schroedinger,
when he first proposed the notion of encoding for biol-
ogy : "In calling the structure of the chromosome fibers a
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code-script we mean that the all-penetrating mind, once
conceived by Laplace, to which every causal connection lay
immediately open, could tell from their structure whether
the egg would develop, under suitable conditions, into a
black cock or into a speckled hen, into a fly or a maize
plant, a rhododendron, a beetle, a mouse or a woman."
(Schrödinger, 1944, 7)6.
In conclusion, applying information theory to biology
is not free from the attitude that tries to reduce complex
biological systems to deterministic systems. On the con-
trary, it is grounded in this attitude and is responsible for
imposing a too strong deterministic account for the living.
As Turing observed in 1950, his Logical Computing Ma-
chine is “Laplacian . . . as prediction is always possible”.
Similarly, in a Shannonian frame, the deterministic trans-
mission of coded information must be predictable, modulo
some noise. Thus, the informational reductionism brought
us back not only to physics, but to a theory of determina-
tion that opposes determination to noise and that is largely
superseded, even in classical physics, by the modern theory
of dynamical systems, since Poincaré (1892). This theory
integrates randomness as part of physical determination
and understands it as unpredictability of (non-linear) de-
terministic dynamics, by a fine analysis of the interplay be-
tween measurement and non-linearity, see (Calude, Longo,
2015) for a synthetic frame for randomness in natural sci-
ences.
4. Conclusion: Metaphors and common sense in
science
Some metaphors are useful in science; they can guide
and inspire scientific research in a deep way. In physics,
for example, the Galilean metaphor of « the world as a
book written in mathematical language by God » (See
Galilei, 1957) is a very inspired metaphysical metaphor
that guided the scientific revolution. It never became a
way of explanation. That means that the Galilean scien-
tific framework never appeals to entities like God or books
in its formal conditions. It is just a metaphor , in the real
sense of an abstract idea that inspires the gesture and the
curiosity of the scientific attitude – even by a somewhat
absurd or paradoxical reference (indeed, the universe does
not have the structure of a book). However, metaphors
become dangerous when they take the place of theories,
and they lose their paradoxical content. Fresh metaphors
in science are metaphors that have not been reduced to the
common sense and reveal a new way of seeing. On the con-
trary, dead metaphors are metaphors that have lost their
paradoxical references, and they literally take the place of
the formal conditions of a theoretical framework. In this
case, they become dangerous for the sciences because they
crystallize a conservative thought into the common sense.
6Turing (1950) also explicitly acknowledges that his Machine, the
founding mathematical structure for programming, is “Laplacian”.
This is the case for the metaphor of the genetic program
related to information. This metaphor does not inspire re-
search but replaces the theoretical framework in order to
support the entire differential method and the reduction-
ist attitude (see Davies, 2009; Longo & Tendero, 2007).
In other words, the strong causal correspondence between
genotype and phenotype is not proved by the differential
method as we have shown above. On the contrary, by
the reference to programmed informational dynamics, a
Laplacian determination is supposed in order to maintain
the general idea of this strong and unidirectional correla-
tion, as in the common interpretation of Crick’s Central
Dogma. It is amazing to observe, as we did, that the
founder of the “coding paradigm”, Schrödinger, was per-
fectly aware of this, since 1944. Later, the metaphor in
question became a theory because the theoretical frame-
work appeals to entities related to this metaphor in order
to justify and build itself: in the DNA there must be a true
program, otherwise the strong correlation fails. This is also
a problem related to the use of common sense in science.
According to the French philosopher Gaston Bachelard,
the uncritical acceptance of common sense is a serious is-
sue for science. This is because, in general, common sense
hides an entire package of metaphysical assumptions.
The general usage of determinism and predictability in
biology is a clear example of this problem. Indeed, as we
mentioned, even when methodological reductionism was
questioned, as it was the case for Mayr, determinism re-
mains the general model of scientific knowledge and in-
spires the metaphor of the genetic program. As a matter
of fact, any programmable process is deterministic and pre-
dictable: it is Laplacian, as we know since Turing. Thus,
the metaphysical package of classical determinism, namely
the idea of a highly predetermined and predictable system
built on the dynamics of the discrete and elementary parts,
was transferred entirely to biological research. The scien-
tific practice then tried to justify and confirm this gen-
eral idea by data, starting by the search for steroespecific
macromolecular interactions (they are required to trans-
mit and elaborate information) and complete autoregula-
tion of genes by genes. As Gaston Bachelard said very well:
There comes a time when the mind’s preference is for what
confirms its knowledge rather than what contradicts it, for
answers rather than questions. The conservative instinct
then dominates and intellectual growth stops. (Bachelard,
2002, p. 25)
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